The Historical Backdrop of Equity Law


The Historical Backdrop of Equity Law
                                                      Shah Mohammad Omer Faruqe Jubaer

Introduction:

The natural and logical fact in early age, whether looked at from the side of that Equity and Common Law originated in one and the same procedure, that during the first two hundred years of their history, they were not distinguished from one another, and that if we now distinguish between them during that period, we do it artificially, by the application of tests impossible to the contemporary procedure or from the side of the courts in which the procedure was employed.

The Common Law originated, as is well enough known, in the new procedure and new judicial machinery brought into England at the Norman Conquest.Its growth as a continuous development was due to the rapid expansion in character and extension in the application which was given in England to old Frankish forms and institutions which had existed in a somnolent condition for many generations .1

In this new legal evolution, the following principle is fundamental from the very beginning;the  new procedure and the new machinery is the king's private property; they are no part of the public the machinery of the state to which any individual may appeal in his personal need as he might to the shire or hundred courts. This principle applied just as truly to the case of the baron who was bound to the king by the tie of feudal vassalage, and consequently a member of the central curia regis, as of the common free- man, or of the knight who was a rear-vassal only; he could not use the new procedure as a matter of right, for this was no part of the procedure of the curia regis, and was never used by it during the first hundred and fifty years unless by a special commission of the king's.

Historical Backdrop of Equity:

 Common-Law and Equity originated together as one undifferentiated system in the effort of the king to carry out his duty of furnishing security and justice to all in the community by making use of his prerogative power through his prerogative machinery.2 The identity of the two systems at the beginning, their origin in the same prerogative action can be clearly seen in this: the essential characteristic of Equity the procedure of a later date is that it begins with a petition asking the king to interfere to secure justice where it would not be secured by the ordinary and existing processes of law. But it was the essential characteristic of all Common-Law actions in the eleventh and twelfth centuries that they began with a petition asking the king to interfere to secure justice where it would not be secured by the ordinary and existing processes of law. In some form, it does not matter in what because forms were not yet fixed, nor the following of a definite form regarded as a matter of importance, the man who wished to have the advantage of the king's prerogative procedure and the use of the king's machinery3, that is, who desired a remedy not provided him by the ordinary judicial system, just ask for it and obtain permission to use it; and the permission must be granted in so demonstrable a way as to authorize or command the royal officials to act in the case.



Equity can be broadly described as being just or fair, whereas the legal meaning of the term equity refers to the rules determined to mitigate the severity of the common law rules and those issues that are not be covered under the common law jurisdiction. Throughout the 13th and 19th centuries, the common law system was developed and advanced in England. Common law is largely uncodified. It is extensively based on precedents or the judicial decisions made in comparable cases. Generally, the decisions of higher courts entrust the judges of the common law system with an enormous role in shaping the law. These precedents are recorded and documented as case laws though yearbook, and legal reports.4

 

To attempt to counteract this discrepancy remedies could be obtained by petitioning the King, who had residual judicial power (certain power delegated to others) to deal with such matters. The King began delegating the function of dealing with such petitions to the Chancellor. The post of Chancellor at this time was usually a clergyman and King’s confessor. The Chancery evolved into a judicial body known as the Court of Chancery until by the end of the 15th century the judicial power of the Chancery was fully recognized. The Court of Chancery was in effect developed as a court of conscience to counteract the defects that existed in the common law system. The rules of equity varied from Chancellor to Chancellor until the end of the 16th century.

 

In the past, the common law largely depended on the judicial precedents, which were much formal and rigid. The inflexibility of the common law system left the people distressed since they were unable to obtain relief from the King's Bench which administered the legal system. Many litigants were disappointed by the common law system when their complaints were dismissed on the basis of non-compliance to the procedures of the court, or due to the lack of precedents on the particular issue. The aggrieved citizens then started petitioning to the King who was positioned at the apex of the legal system, also known as the “Fountain of Justice.” These petitions appealed the king to do justice on certain issues that were not addressed or were not justly dealt by the Kings Bench.5 With the increase of petitions made to the King, he gave the task of inquiring on these requests to the “Keeper of the king’s Conscience” or the Chancellor who headed the Chancery. The Chancellor usually determined the petitions based on moral grounds. In other words, chancery would either issue or withhold relief according to his sense of what is right and wrong or on a merit basis, unlike based on the judicial precedents of the common law courts.6

The independence of the court of chancery was established in the year 1474 when the chancellor had issued the first decree in his own name. The chancellor was not bound by the English writ system to use juries during the trials.7 He had the sole discretion and authority to summon the people to inquire on the cases, order disclosure of documents, to decide the cases based on what is morally right.8

By the 17th century only lawyers were appointed to the office of Chancellor. From 1529 onwards when Sir Thomas Moore was appointed as Chancellor Records of proceedings in Courts of Chancery was kept which led to the development of equitable doctrines.9

We must say not that Equity originated in Common-Law, but that Common Law originated in Equity, in the desire to secure justice for all more surely than existing law would do it, to establish an equitable procedure and to furnish equitable remedies. When we go on into the thirteenth century, we pass into a time when the older system of law and courts was rapidly falling into insignificance before the advance of the newer system.10

The body of law has its foundations in the court of Chancery, in general, a concern with issues of conscience and natural justice, and imposing flexible reliefs on a discretionary basis.11

·        Informed by conscience

·        Discretion and remedial

·        The result of long historical process.

Later, the Court was formally led by the Lord Chancellor, assisted by the judges of the common law courts. The staff of the court included a large number of clerks, led by the master of Rolls who regularly heard cases on his own. In 1813 a vice-chancellor was appointed to deal with the Chancery's increasing backlogs, and two more were appointed in 1841. 12

Concluding Remarks:

The Court of Chancery originated, as did the other High Courts before 1875, in the Norman or King's Council, maintained by most early rulers of England after 1066. The Chancery came to prominence after the decline of the Exchequer, dealing with the Law of Equity, something more fluid and adaptable than the Common Law.13 The early Court of Chancery dealt with verbal contracts, matters of land law and matters of trust, and had a very liberal view when setting aside complaints; poverty, for example, was an acceptable reason to cancel a contract or obligation. By 1345 the Lord Chancellor began to be seen as the leader of the Court of Chancery, rather than as a representative of the King, and writs and bills were addressed directly to him.  From the Legal system to Remedial Procedures that the court of equity or the Chancery court system is an element of English Law.

 

Here are a few terms used in this article like:  

Curia Regis: is a term meaning "royal council" or kings Court.

The master of Rolls: The Master of the Rolls was initially a clerk responsible for keeping the "Rolls" or records and was known as the Keeper of the Rolls of Chancery.

Feudalism: was a combination of legal, economic, military and cultural customs that flourished in medieval Europe between the 9th and 15th centuries.

 

References:

1.      Such portions of the older law and procedure as survived for any considerable time did so in the end because they were taken up into, or originally formed a part of, this newer System.

2.      Bigelow, The procedure, 76-79; Adams, Origin Engl. Const., 96-105. "Glanvill, Bk. I., c. 6.

3.      The equitable character of the praecipe writ is seen even more clearly in the form used to enforce the payment of a debt, Glanvill, Bk. X.

4.      Pearce, R and Stevens, J, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 2nd Ed p4 – 7

5.      T. Cockburn, T, Harris, W, & Shirley, M, Equity & Trusts, 2005,Butterworths

6.      Holdsworth, W, History of English Law, 7th Ed, 1956, Mathuen & Co Ltd

7.      J.D Heydon and Leeming, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4th Edition) 2002.

8.      Sir Anthony Mason. ‘ The place of Equitable remedies in the contemporary common Law world’ 1994

9.      John C.P Goldberg , Equity and Law, Cambridge University Press, July 2019

10.  Sarah Worthington, Equity, Oxford University Press, 2006.

11.  Phillip H. Pettit, Equity and The Law of Trusts, Oxford University Press, August 2012.

12.  Alastair Hudson, Taylor and Francis, July 2015.

13.  Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity and Restitution, November 2017.


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